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Abstract 
In recent years, scholars and policymakers have placed growing attention on 
the issue of aid effectiveness, that is, the efficiency of donor assistance in 
achieving stated economic and human development objectives. While research 
has tended to highlight the need for greater capacity building and improved 
governance as mechanisms to make aid 'effective', the social origins of such 
mechanisms have not been thoroughly examined. Using the latest cross-
country indicator series on aid effectiveness from the OECD and the Indices 
of Social Development, hosted at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague, 
this paper examines the determinants of effective aid spending, and finds a 
significant effect linking the quality of aid assistance to social institutions 
relating to public order and trust. These effects are verified when 
instrumenting social institutions by measures of state history, suggesting that 
long-term political development is the main source of public order and the 
presence of state institutions capable of effective management of aid flows. 
Whereas in the 1970s international donors were willing to provide 
significant assistance to governments with major weaknesses in budgetary 
oversight and accountability, such as Mobutu’s Zaire or Suharto’s Indonesia, in 
recent years, there has been a growing recognition among donors that not only 
the quantity of international development aid but also its efficient use matters 
for international development. To this end, for example, the 2005 Paris 
Declaration saw partner countries and donors agree to hold each other 
accountable for making progress against agreed commitments and targets by 
monitoring their implementation, and in a series of follow-up summits these 
commitments have been further built upon (OECD 2005). 
However, as yet the conditions which lead to the effective use of donor 
aid have not been extensively studied. In a widely cited article, Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) attempted to show that the impact of aid on GDP growth is 
positive and significant in developing countries with ‘sound’ institutions and 
economic policies (i.e. open trade, fiscal and monetary discipline) and not 
significant in countries with "poor" such policies. However, their study has 
 4 
 
been extensively criticized on account of the lack of robustness of their 
estimates and the underspecification of their models (Roodman 2007, Easterly 
et al. 2000). To some extent, these problems are inherent within studies of aid 
effectiveness, which must overcome the endogeneity of aid allocation to 
economic underperformance (as donors may prioritize countries with greater 
development challenges), the long and variable lag that may exist between 
provision of development aid and its expected outcomes, and the difficulty of 
operationalising ‘effectiveness’ itself. As a result, empirical literature in this field 
remains underdeveloped, despite the massive importance of the research for 
policymakers and the international development community more generally.  
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1 An Alternative Approach to Studying Aid Effectiveness 
Aid effectiveness can be defined as the degree to which donor assistance 
succeeds in delivering upon its stated objectives, such as raising standards of 
health, literacy, facilitating economic growth or improving standards of 
governance. As a result, finding a reliable measure of aid effectiveness is 
fraught with difficulty: first, donor aid projects may have very long project 
cycles, making it difficult to identify results, and second, different metrics may 
be applicable to different interventions. Despite efforts to introduce greater 
quantitative metrics into aid evaluation, the value of most projects is still left to 
qualitative judgments by development professionals operating in the field, who 
have the benefit of familiarity with the country context, and can inspect the 
gap between a project’s intentions and the quality of delivery by local partners 
in government and civil society.  
 
As a consequence, this paper uses a proxy for such perceptions, by using 
the proportion of donor aid which is handed over to country responsibility - 
for example via direct budget support - as an indicator of the effectiveness of 
country governments in making use of donor funds. While there are a number 
of possible explanations for variation in using partner countries’ systems, 
principle among these are donors’ fears of financial misuse, the desire for risk 
avoidance, and the desire for control over how resources are allocated (OECD, 
2011b). By contrast, where governments are perceived to be reliable partners 
and have delivered on aid projects with donor financing, international donors 
are more likely to give money to country governments to disburse, while a 
reputation for corruption, displacement, or ineffective delivery will cause 
donors to cease financing, or seek alternative means of dispensation such as 
partnership with international NGOs or local civil society groups.  Similarly, a 
major factor preventing aid effectiveness is the fungibility of aid into 
unproductive activities in the public sector, where aid recipients offset their 
 6 
 
prior commitments with donor funds and divert the former into other areas of 
spending (Mosley 1987). 
Researching the ability of recipient governments to run their own aid 
budgets takes on particular policy relevance at the present time, as a major 
plank of the 2005 Paris Declaration envisages an increase in the ownership by 
developing countries, with the latter leading their own development policies 
and strategies, and managing their own development work on the ground 
(OECD 2011a). This will inevitably entail that a higher proportion of donor 
aid that will be channeled via country systems, rather than be directly managed 
by donor agencies. It is thus especially important to understand the 
circumstances under which such systems are reliable for use, with sufficient 
local expertise, institutions and management to ensure the effective use of 
donor funds with minimal waste, graft, or diversion into unforeseen areas of 
expenditure.  
 
2 Empirical Tests 
As a proxy for the extent to which aid is effectively deployed within countries, 
this paper takes an indicator or the extent to which international aid donors 
make use of developing countries’ public financial management (PFM) 
systems, collated and published in the recent OECD (2011a) flagship report on 
aid effectiveness. The measure of donor use of country PFM measures the 
percentage of aid provided by donors that makes use of three elements of 
partner countries’ PFM systems: budget execution, financial reporting and 
auditing. The indicator shows the average percentage of aid for the 
government sector using country PFM systems across these three components 
(OECD 2011a). While there may be context-specific reasons why any one 
particular donor may trust a recipient with direct budget support, we can 
expect such particularities to cancel out in aggregate, such that donor use of 
country PFM is a good proxy for their perception of recipient governments’ 
reliability.  
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What factors might determine why some country governments are 
perceived as more reliable partners in implementing development projects than 
others? First, levels of corruption will deter the effective use of donor funds 
due to obvious reasons, such as embezzlement or fraud. Where recipient 
governments are believed to divert monies for personal gain, whether it is the 
use of project funds for discretionary purchases, the practice of clientelism via 
job creation on donor projects, or, at the limit simple embezzlement of project 
resources, donors are unlikely to continue future cooperation unless driven by 
higher-level political exigencies. We can therefore include as an independent 
variable a measure of control of corruption, taken from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, as a measure in this regard. Similarly, other aspects of 
governance may also matter, such as the existence of a strong and meritocratic 
bureaucracy which is capable of implementing projects on the ground: even 
where a government is not engaged in ostensibly corrupt behaviour, failure of 
practical implementation in donor projects may cause donors to seek 
alternative partners in order to accomplish development goals. A variable for 
government effectiveness, also from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, is 
also included in our regression models.  
 
Second, we also include the full range of the social development indices 
from the Indicators of Social Development project, which has aggregated over 
200 indicators from over 25 sources into a series of six indices (Foa and 
Tanner 2011). The rationale for doing so, is as follows. The strength of civil 
society might determine the allocation of funds to the government sector, as 
disbursing funds via local partner NGOs is one of the main alternatives to 
using country systems. The strength of the civic sector is captured by two 
measures from the indices of social development: a civic activism index which 
measures the extent of popular participation in protest, petition, and media; 
and a clubs and associations index which tracks data on membership of voluntary 
associations and groups. Even if we believe that the proportion of donor aid 
spent via country PFM reflects as much the reliability of civil society partners 
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as it does the effectiveness of government spending, it is important to include 
these variables as controls.  
 
Third, the level of cohesion between ethnic and religious groups may act as an 
important determinant of aid effectiveness, due to the association between 
intergroup fragmentation, clientelism, and poor governance (Alesina et al. 
2003). We therefore include the indices of social development measure for 
intergroup cohesion, which takes data on ethnic ties and tensions between salient 
groups in each society. Fourth, a more general measure of interpersonal safety 
and trust, based on data on reported social trust and levels of crime, may be a 
predictor of aid effectiveness due to the complementarities of social capital 
with the functioning of formal institutions. Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas 
(2009), for example, find a statistical association between ‘social capital’ and the 
level of aid effectiveness. The interpersonal safety and trust item is therefore 
included in the regression. Finally, gender equality may be associated with the 
effectiveness of development aid, in line with research linking women’s 
empowerment and improved resource management, and a measure of gender 
equality from the indices is also included (Westermann, Ashby, and Pretty 
2005). 
 
In addition, a measure for log GDP per capita is also included, in case 
there are factors which lead donors to prioritize or de-emphasize use of 
country financial systems to disburse aid in low-income versus medium-income 
economies.  
 
 
The model to be estimated is:  
 
 
 
3...2,..,1 xxxy nn   
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where y is the percentage of donor aid that is channeled via country 
systems, x1 is a series of indicators of governance, x2 is the set of social 
development indices, and x3 is a measure of log income per capita.  
 
Results with a range of model specifications are shown below in Table 
1.  
TABLE 1 
 Proportion of Donor Aid Entrusted to Country Governments 
Dependent variable: Percentage of Donor Aid Channeled via Country PFM, 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Log GDP per capita 
-
0.104 
(0.083) 
-
0.176** 
(0.062) 
-
0.147** 
(0.05) 
Civic Activism, 2005 
0.0
82 
(0.546) 
0.247 
(0.482) 
- 
Gender Equality, 2005 
0.3 
(0.467) 
0.4 
(0.386) 
0.257 
(0.342) 
Interpersonal Safety and Trust, 
2005 
1.2
48*** 
(0.354) 
1.149*
** (0.31) 
1.184
*** 
(0.288) 
Clubs and Associations, 2005 
0.2
93 
(0.204) 
- - 
Intergroup Cohesion, 2005 
-
0.819 
(0.43) 
-
0.945* 
(0.373) 
-
0.917** 
(0.34) 
Control of Corruption, 2005 
0.3
62 
(0.198) 
0.262 
(0.147) 
0.249
** (0.09) 
Government Effectiveness, 
2005 
-
0.222 
(0.2) 
0.000 
(0.139) 
- 
Constant 
0.9
22 
(0.721) 
1.634*
* (0.507) 
1.541
*** 
(0.442) 
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N 37 47 50 
Adj. r2 
0.3
05 0.295 0.325 
    
* significant at the 0.05 level, ** significant at the 0.01 level, *** significant at the 
0.001 level. 
 
The most striking feature of the multivariate models is the robustness 
of the association between the interpersonal safety and trust measure, and the 
proportion of aid monies channeled via domestic country systems. This is 
consistent with the argument and empirical results found in Baliamoune-Lutz 
and Mavrotas (2009), namely that higher levels of ‘social capital’ may increase 
aid effectiveness. The results also indicate that donors entrust proportionately 
more of their aid to country governments which are higher income, which 
have lower levels of corruption, and in societies that have higher levels of 
safety and interpersonal trust. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the coefficients 
appear to indicate that governments in societies with lower levels of intergroup 
cohesion are more likely to receive direct funding from donors; meanwhile, no 
significant effect is found between use of country systems and gender equality, 
either of the two civil society measures, or government effectiveness.   
 
In accordance with our expectations, in the final specification (Model 
3) control of corruption emerges as significantly associated with use of country 
PFM, such that donors channel significantly larger shares of aid to 
governments with lower levels of corruption than those in which corruption is 
greater. The magnitude of the effect indicates a 25 percentage point increase in 
donor aid for each unit increase in the control of corruption score, which runs 
approximately from -2.5 to +2.5.  
 
Yet the largest and most robust association appears to run between the 
interpersonal safety and trust measure and use of recipient government 
institutions to disburse aid, insofar as a 29.5 percentage point increase in use of 
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country PFM results from each 0.25 increase on the safety and trust index.  
The strength of this association is shown in Figure 1, which simply shows the 
bivariate scatterplot of the two variables, without controls. The correlation 
coefficient of r = 0.44 indicates a reasonable degree of covariance between the 
two indicators.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 Use of Country PFM, and Interpersonal Safety and Trust Index 
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The bivariate association tells us that in countries with lower crime and 
greater interpersonal trust, for example, Vietnam, Egypt, or Jordan, donors are 
more likely to make use of country systems to disburse aid funds, rather than 
attempt to disburse such finds via other channels such as partner NGOs or 
direct assistance. This association is brought out even more clearly in the 
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residual plot that control for the variables in the regression, which is shown 
below in Figure 2.  
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FIGURE 2 
 Use of Country PFM, and Interpersonal Safety and Trust Index (Residual Plot from 
Regression Model 3) 
Colombia
Swaziland
Keny a
South Af rica
Guatemala
Cameroon
Mozambique
Honduras
El Salv ador
Sudan
Namibia
Nigeria
Lesotho
Papua New Guinea
B rkina Faso
Ecuador
Uganda
Burundi
Peru
Jamaica
Rwanda
Boliv ia
Mongolia
Cambodia
Moldov a
Ky rgy z Republic
Tanzania
Zambia
Bangladesh
Dominican Republic
Ghana
Mali
BotswanaEthiopia
Benin
Ukraine
Albania
Gabo
Tajikistan
Malawi
Cape Verde
SenegalMacedonia, FYR
Pakistan
Morocco
Nepal
Fiji
Philippines
Indonesia
Jordan
ArmeniaEgy pt, Arab Rep.
Vietnam
Tonga
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t 
p
lu
s
 r
e
s
id
u
a
l
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
Safety and Trust Index
 
 
3   Explaining the Association from Interpersonal Safety 
and Trust to Aid Effectiveness 
 
Why are donors so much more likely to entrust funds to governments in 
countries where levels of social trust and public order are relatively high? One 
explanation for this association would be that levels of social trust may reflect 
something about the reliability of partner governments to refrain from 
practices such as embezzlement or wasteful use of resources. However, in the 
regression models we have already controlled for measures of quality of 
governance, such as corruption and government effectiveness, making such an 
interpretation problematic. A second interpretation might be that the level of 
social trust and criminality determines the ease with which projects can be 
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implemented on the ground: in extreme high crime environments, there may 
be practical barriers to implementation, related to the danger of operating in 
slum areas or remote region of a country. Yet a problem here is that our 
measure only shows the proportion of funds which are given to country PFM, 
rather than funds overall; and we have no reason to believe that in countries 
with weak social institutions we would expect civil society actors to prove any 
more or less reliable partners for donor organizations that the official 
government sector.  
 
In their finding that countries with higher levels of social trust 
experience more rapid economic growth, Knack and Keefer (1997) suggest 
that survey items on social trust may reflect some unobserved aspect of the rule of 
law and functioning of institutions: that in countries with more effective 
mechanisms for regulating interpersonal relations and providing contract 
security, levels of trust will be correspondingly higher, even if the nature of 
such mechanisms may vary from country to country, or be rooted in informal 
institutions or cultural norms rather than explicit institutional mechanisms. 
Given the high correlation between surveys of social trust and measures of 
crime, and the prevalence of crime data in the estimation of the interpersonal 
safety and trust scores, this appears an intuitive interpretation of the finding. 
The interpersonal safety and trust index aggregates data on crime victimization 
from Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer and the International Crime Victim 
Survey, data on homicide from the UN, WHO, and Interpol, and rates of 
crime prevalence and social trust from surveys such as the World Values 
Surveys, Asian Barometer, and the Doing Business surveys.  
 
Yet to return to our earlier question, why would measures of trust or 
crime prove better proxies for institutional quality than other governance 
indicators, such as the control of corruption and government effectiveness 
measures, which are also included in the regressions above? Here there are two 
potential answers. The first is that ‘direct’ measures of crime are a better 
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indicator of the rule of law than ratings based primarily upon expert 
assessments, due to response bias and ‘halo effects’ in the case of the latter: in 
that countries are rewarded based on positive but irrelevant attributes such as 
their level of income per capita or democracy (Rose-Ackerman 2004). As such, 
the interpersonal safety and trust measure may capture aspects of the overall 
level of lawfulness that are not captured in expert-assessment ratings, or 
aggregative indices based on such ratings. This is illustrated by figure 3, which 
shows the correlation of income per capita with the Worldwide Governance 
Indicator for Rule of Law - which aggregates a range of expert ratings, along 
with harder crime data - and then the correlation of income per capita with a 
World Health Organisation measure for humanly-caused deaths per 100,000 
(perhaps the most valid measure of the extent to which citizens live in security 
of their life and estate). Ratings of rule of law correlate to a far greater degree 
with income per capita than with the actual risk to one’s livelihood.  
 
FIGURE 3 
 In General, Subjective Ratings Correlate Highly with Income per capita, but 
‘Actionable’ Items do not – suggestive of Halo Effects and Response Bias 
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The second argument by which direct measures of crime and 
interpersonal trust may function as more reliable estimates of the reliability of 
governments to manage donor projects, is that they capture a different aspect 
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of variation in government effectiveness that is not accounted for in 
governance indices, for example because they capture informal institutions and 
norms rather than the formal policies or institutions measured in ratings 
projects.  
4   Further Empirical Tests 
We can test the hypothesis that levels of interpersonal safety and trust are 
reflective of deeper processes of institutional development, by instrumenting 
for the interpersonal safety and trust item using the State Antiquity index 
produced by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002), which is a historical 
variable for state formation. This index is constructed by taking each period 
from 1 to 1950 AD, and allocating points to countries if there was i) a 
government above the tribal level; ii) if that government was locally based 
rather than that of a foreign empire; and iii) a fractional point to represent the 
extent of the country's modern territory that was under the control of this 
earlier government. The data from the fifty periods is combined, thereby 
offering an index of state history for a large sample of countries. In their 
analyses, Bockstette et al. (2002) show that this measure is correlated with 
measures of political stability and rule of law, as well as rates of economic 
growth during the period following decolonisation (1960-95).  
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FIGURE 4 
 State Antiquity Index 
 
Source: Bockstette et al. (2002). Shown is the state history index with a discount rate 50. This 
measure is used consistently throughout this analysis.  
The distribution of ‘state history’ across the world is shown in Figure 4. 
It can be seen that the largest concentrations are in Eurasia, and specifically 
across the ‘chain of civilizations’ running from western Europe, to the lands of 
the former Ottoman Empire, to Persia, India, and finally to China and Japan. 
Smaller concentrations can also be seen around the indigenous civilizations of 
the Americas, and around the horn of Africa. It is largely across the Eurasian 
belt, however, that from the early modern period states began to take shape in 
something like their present borders, and where we see the beginnings of 
centralized monarchies, a salaried, selective, and trained bureaucracy, 
mechanisms of state surveillance and control, such as the census and land 
cadastre, and the beginnings of comprehensive tax reforms.  
 
Results after instrumentation are shown in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 
 Two-Stage Least Squares, Using State Antiquity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Interpersonal Safety and 
Trust, instrumented using the 
State Antiquity Index 
1.464* 
(0.599) 
1.965* 
(0.902) 
1.769* 
(0.789) 
Log GDP per capita 
0.002 
(0.079) 
-0.058 
(0.07) 
-0.075 
(0.052) 
Civic Activism 
-0.159 
(0.576) 
-0.262 
(0.608) 
- 
Gender Equality 
-0.118 
(0.373) 
-0.137 
(0.38) 
-0.152 
(0.328) 
Clubs and Associations 
0.411 
(0.203) 
- - 
Control of Corruption 
0.288 
(0.181) 
0.081 
(0.146) 
0.085 
(0.089) 
Government Effectiveness 
-0.297 
(0.216) 
-0.034 
(0.155) 
- 
Constant 
-0.221 
(0.67) 
0.249 
(0.627) 
0.368 
(0.532) 
    
    
N 36 48 15 
Adj. r2 0.276 0.04 0.14 
    
Instrumenting for social trust and safety using the state antiquity 
variable, we remain able to predict donor usage of country mechanisms to 
disburse assistance flows. The implication of this result is that there is some 
portion of the variance in social institutions, in the form of the safety and trust 
measure, which reflects the process of state formation and which also explains 
the perceived reliability of country governments in managing aid projects 
independently.  
5   Thinking about State History as a Long-Term 
Determinant of  State Capacity 
Why would state formation serve as a predictor of both contemporary levels of 
trust and public order, as measured by the interpersonal safety and trust index, 
and the perceived reliability of recipient governments to disburse donor funds? 
Such an argument would be consistent with a range of recent regional studies 
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which support the association between legacies of central government and its 
contemporary performance in areas such as delivering public goods. In South 
Asia, for example, the differential performance of parts of India following the 
‘states reform’ of the 1950s appears to be traceable to legacies of precolonial 
state formation. Gerring et al. (2011) show that indirect rule was the preferred 
mode of governing in areas where precolonial polities were already well-
developed, and Bannerjee and Iyer (2004) have shown that such areas have 
tended to do better economically since independence. Likewise, Singh (2011) 
shows that the success of public goods delivery in states of contemporary India 
can be explained not by ‘social capital,’ but rather by ‘regional subnationalism’, 
which in turn reflects the legitimacy and coherence of precolonial subnational 
polities (Singh 2009, 2011).   
 
Not only in South Asia, but also in Africa, the recent literature points 
to evidence of an association between historical state formation and the 
current performance of public institutions. Looking at public goods provision 
within Africa, Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) find that precolonial centralization 
is associated with higher levels of provision, as countries with a greater 
proportion of centralized ethnic groups have more paved roads, a greater 
percent of infants immunized for DPT, lower infant mortality, a higher adult 
literacy rate, and greater schooling attainment. They hypothesize that 
precolonial centralization improved public goods provision by increasing the 
accountability of local chiefs. Likewise, taking the case of Botswana, 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Robinson and Parsons (2006) 
argue that the country’s exceptional record of public administration within 
Africa is a consequence, not of ethnic homogeneity, but rather precolonial 
processes of political centralization, driven by conflict against outsiders. Again, 
the performance of postcolonial institutions appears to be rooted in the 
strength of precolonial political structures.  
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The notion that there is a link between long-term processes of state 
formation in developing countries and the quality of their public institutions, 
and in particular their ability to deliver public services, is therefore well-rooted 
in the literature.  
 
Higher levels of trust and safety (low crime) are quite likely a direct 
consequence of long-term processes of state formation, which explains why 
the state antiquity measure functions well as an instrument for the safety and 
trust index. Indeed, we can show the strong predictive effect of state antiquity 
upon measures of interpersonal safety and trust in a series of regressions on 
the components of this index. 
 
From the data sources gathered under the personal security and safety 
cluster, it is possible to take a subset of 37 indicators that have been aggregated 
by the Indices of Social Development into 9 subindices, each reflecting a 
different source2. These 9 subindices cover Afrobarometer survey responses 
on personal security and crime risk, International Crime Victim Survey 
responses on crime victimization, World Health Organisation estimates of the 
rate of violent death, based on postmortem assessment, data released by 
governments to Interpol on rates of fraud, murder, theft and rape, under 
condition of anonymity, business surveys asking managers to assess the 
salience of crime as a business constraint, Latinobarometer data on crime 
victimization, International Crime Victim Survey items on perceptions of 
personal security and safety, and United Nations Criminal Justice Information 
Network data on the rate of homicide per 100,000. In addition, these are 
supplemented by an additional item selected to measure aspects of compliance 
with the state, such as surveyed willingness to pay taxes (World Values Survey 
2000-7). The figures below then show both the raw correlation between state 
                                                 
2 The International Crime Victim Survey data has been broken down into two subindices, one for the 
‘pure’ crime victimization questions, reflecting whether one has been subject to certain kinds of 
criminal act (fraud, robbery, extortion, etc) and the second for subjective perceptions of safety and 
security (whether one feels safe in one’s neighbourhood at night, etc).  
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history and the relevant subcomponent from the indices of social development 
project, followed by the partial correlation after controlling for log GDP per 
capita, ethnolingustic fractionalisation, membership of voluntary associations 
and colonial status (0/1). Note that for the survey indices which take crime 
items (Afrobarometer and ICVS), the polarities are reversed such that a higher 
score indicates a lower level of criminality. 
 
FIGURES 5 
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International Crime Victim Survey, 
Crime Victimization Rates and State History (r 
= 0.42) 
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 Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 
0.089)† 
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WHO (Log) Homicide Rate and State 
History (r = -0.37) 
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Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 
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Interpol Crime Rate and State History (r 
= -0.42) 
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World Bank Business  Survey 
(Managers Stating Crime as a Major 
Business Constraint) and State History (r = 
0.44) 
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Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 
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Latinobarometer Crime Victimization 
and State History (r = -0.44) 
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Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 
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International Crime Victim Survey “Feel 
Safe in Neighbourhood” Items and State 
History (r = 0.44) 
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Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 
0.005)** 
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Acceptable to ‘Cheat on Taxes if you 
have the Chance’ and State History (r = 
0.18) 
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Component-plus-Residual Plot (p = 0.05)* 
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These plots suggest that, for most operationalisations of the 
interpersonal safety and trust items, there appears to be a strong association 
with state history. Because state history is lagged deep into the past, it cannot 
be caused by the contemporary degree of rule of law; therefore we may assume 
that either it is causally prior or that there is some additional, omitted variable 
which can explain this covariance.  
 
6   Conclusion 
This paper adds fresh insights to the debate on aid effectiveness, using an 
altenative proxy for the extent to which country institutions are capable of 
disbursing aid flows effectively. If we assume that donor willingness to use 
country PFM, such as budget support, is a measure of the perceived reliability 
of such systems, then we can estimate the social and political institutional 
factors which make such willingness more or less likely. In line with our 
theoretical assumptions, levels of corruption are a significant determinant of 
donor willingness to work via recipient governments in disbursing aid flows. 
However the strongest and most robust association is between use of country 
financial management systems and levels of social trust and safety, which we 
interpret as reflecting an otherwise unobserved component of the reliability of 
recipient governments in delivering upon aid projects.    
 25 
 
In terms of the implications of these results for policymakers, there are 
perhaps two points which can be made. The first is that donor avoidance of 
using country PFM, including budget support, is rational, and can be explained 
empirically. Thus a quite sober conclusion is that the objective of increasing 
donor aid via country PFM may be inappropriate, where such systems have not 
been rigorously evaluated for their reliability and effectiveness. The fact that 
donor usage of direct mechanisms such as budgetary support can indeed be 
strongly predicted by indices of corruption or social trust seems supportive of 
the interpretation that donor take-up - or avoidance - of country PFM is a 
entirely rational response to the perceived reliability of such systems. Donors 
should not rush to increase their use of country institutions where such 
institutions are not trusted.  
    Second, donors may nonetheless be underutilizing the domestic 
management capacity of some countries, and social institution indices can be a 
useful diagnostic for identifying cases where increased take-up of country PFM 
is more or less likely to succeed; from the regressions in Table 1 for example, it 
is possible to use the residuals to show where use of PFM is less than would be 
expected, based on our social and political institutional data. In countries such 
as Mali, Mongolia, Rwanda and Albania the proportion of aid disbursed by 
country PFM is far lower than we would predict based on these estimates, with 
direct support to the government being less than 50 per cent in most cases. 
Analysis of social and governance indices may therefore be a useful mechanism 
for identifying cases where country ownership of development project can be 
increased, in line with the commitments made in the Paris Declaration.  
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